The Demographic Timing of Global Political & Socioeconomic Change

Richard Cincotta
rcincotta@stimson.org

Woodrow Wilson Global Fellow
Fellow, The Stimson Center

www.politicaldemography.org

For: World Affairs Council of Albuquerque
Aug. 13, 2019
Age-structural Time
The Age-structural Transition

2015

Data: UN Population Division, 2017 Rev.

Updated from Cincotta, 2012

**Tunisia**

- **1965**
  - Median age: 17.1
  - Pop.: 4.5 million

- **1990**
  - Median age: 20.9
  - Pop.: 8.2 million

- **2010**
  - Median age: 29.0
  - Pop.: 10.6 million

- **2025**
  - Median age: 35.6
  - Pop.: 12.3 million
Vietnam: Then and Now
Example: Iran
The Demographic

*End of History?*
Global Trends:

Four Phases of the Age-Structural Transition

Age-Structural Timeline
Age-structural Change
2015 to 2035

UN Population Division
estimates and projections

Cincotta, 2015 (updated)

Data: UN Population Div., 2017
Demographic Window

YTH → INT → MAT → PMT

Negative

- Infant mortality decline
- Positive age-structural momentum
- Labor migration (to MAT & PMT)
- Fertility increase **
- Mid-age & senior mortality increase **

Positive

- Fertility decline
- Adult mortality decrease
- Negative age-structural momentum
- Labor migration (to YTH & INT) *
- Infant mortality increase **
Europe’s movement toward post-maturity

[Diagram showing TFR (Total Fertility Rate) with age groups and demographic categories.]
Development in

Age-structural Time
Political Liberalism in age-structural time

Data: 1975 to 2018

![Graph showing probability of being Free, Not Free, Partly Free across different age groups. The graph illustrates the transition of probabilities over age, with distinct sections labeled YTH, INT, MAT, and PMT. The graph highlights an attractor point, indicating a specific age at which the transition is most probable.](image)
Trends in Political Liberalism

1975 to 2018

Data: Freedom House, 2019; UN Population Div., 2019
Gains & Losses in Liberal Democracy (by age-structure)

1973 to 2018

Gains exceed losses
The Income Transition

Probability
Beyond expectations:

Account for the usual:

- States with small populations (<5 million)
- Oil & mineral rich states (rents >15% of GDP)

Beware of those factors that defy expectations:

- Exclusive ideologies (able to sustain a political monopoly);
- Prolonged domestic conflict or ethnic unrest;
- Intrusive neighbors;
- Disparate majority-minority rates of demographic change.
Back to the
Chronological Future
The Age-structural Transition

2015

Data: UN Population Division, 2017 Rev.

Updated from Cincotta, 2012
Age-structural Change
1995 to 2010

Data: UN Population Div., 2017
Age-structural Change
2015 to 2035

Cincotta, 2015 (updated)

Data: UN Population Div., 2017
The Demographic Timing of Global Political & Socioeconomic Change

Richard Cincotta
rcincotta@stimson.org

Woodrow Wilson Global Fellow
Dir., Global Political Demography Program,
The Stimson Center